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SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS

Professor Rice, your view of the constitutional
scheme is that Congress has the power to make surgical excisions
to the jurisdictions of the federal courts. I wonder if you would
comment on what one of my colleagues might call the worst case
scenario. That is, whether Congress could by legislation abolish
all inferior federal courts and eliminate all Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. What then would remain of the judicial power?
JUDGE SLOVITR:

PROF. RicE: That is a very interesting question. First of all,
when you look at the lower federal courts, it is quite clear that
Congress never was required to establish them. Congress has complete authority over the lower courts, and, in theory, Congress could
abolish the lower federal courts.
Now, the other question is whether Congress could take away
all the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? It might be
instructive to note that on the one hand that is exactly what Justice
Owen Roberts said Congress could do.1 However, there is obviously nothing authoritative on the issue. There is no limit on
Congress' power built into article III, section 2.2 Therefore, in
theory, I think the answer is yes-Congress could divest all Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction. I do have a problem related to what
Professor Hart talks about in his article.3 When conjecturing about
the problem of the essential role of the Supreme Court, he posited
a case where Congress withdrew jurisdiction in everything but patent cases and he thought that that might be beyond Congress'
1. See Roberts, Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J.
1 (1949).

2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Clause 2 defines the scope of the

Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdiction as follows:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and

Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before
mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make.
Id.
3. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953).

(1042)
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article III, section 2 power. I also have a problem with a total
use of the exception clause power. I think it is arguable that if
Congress attempted to wholly obliterate Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction that it would cease to be an "exception" to jurisdiction
within the meaning of the clause. In that situation, Congress would
be acting unconstitutionally. However, with that reservation, it is
theoretically true, just as Justice Roberts said, that Congress could
take away all Supreme Court jurisdiction.
JUDGE

SLOVITER:

I am not sure.

I also read Justice Roberts'

article and although I don't remember exactly what he said, I recall him saying that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
depends on the Judiciary Act.4 I don't remember Justice Roberts
saying, "all the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could
be divested," but he may have said it. That is why he wanted to
propose a major constitutional amendment to limit Congressional
control. However, that is still only one Justice's opinion.
It seems to me that your initial reaction to the question is not
much different than Professor Ratner's. Are you saying that there
is some credence to essential functions theory?
PROF. RICE: Here is what Justice Roberts said and I quote:
"I do not see any reason why Congress cannot, if it elects to do so,
take away entirely the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States over state supreme court decisions." 5 Now,
I think he is theoretically correct.
JUDGE SLOVITER:

That is over state supreme court decisions.

If you abolish the lower federal courts, then you
would not have jurisdiction over lower federal courts anyway.
PROF. RICE:

I would like to ask Professor Rice a question. In
addition to the limitation you have just mentioned, what other
limitations on the exceptions clause would you concede?
MR. KAY:

I do not agree that there are any limitations on
PROF. RICE:
Congress' power in terms of the exceptions clause 6 itself. I think
Congress' power is as broad in theory as Justice Roberts said it was,
although it would be obviously imprudent to exercise it that way.
You do have the external limitations which Professor Redish men4. The Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
5. Roberts, supra note 1, at 4.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

see note 2 supra.

For the text of the exceptions clause,
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tions. These external limitations bind Congress in the exercise of
any of its powers-for example the commerce clause. Congress

could not pass a statute saying that Blacks may not engage in interstate commerce or that the Supreme Court shall have no jurisdiction over appeals by Blacks. But, those are not limitations arising
from article III, section 2. These limitations are the same ones
which affect all congressional powers.
MR. KAY: The thing that troubles me about saying, for example, that the equal protection clause 7 is a limitation on the
exceptions clause power is this: Congress could enact a statute and
section 1 would say, "No access to the federal courts for Blacks."
Then section 2 of the statute would say, "No federal court jurisdiction over equal protection cases." Based on what Professor Rice
is saying, while section 1 is unconstitutional, section 2 is constitutional and permissible.
PROF. RICE: Well, of course, Congress could say, "there will
be no appellate jurisdiction in equal protection cases."

MR. KAY:

What I am saying is that the unconstitutionality of

section 1 of this hypothetical bill is irrelevant because it could
never be contested in a federal court.
PROF. RICE:

That is correct, though it could be contested in a

state court. I think that is the overriding point. I am not saying
that this has been settled by the Supreme Court although the language in the Klein 8 case said that if Congress took away jurisdiction over a class of cases, there could be no doubt that such power
would be properly exercised. I think the ultimate analysis of the
kind of situation that you are suggesting would be to say: "Well,
Congress has the power to remove jurisdiction over any and all
classes of cases as long as those classes of cases are defined by the
nature of the case."
I also think you would have to read into an exercise of exceptions clause power, as well as into the exercise of the commerce
power or any other power of Congress, the supervening constitutional prohibitions such as the establishment clause. For example,
suppose Congress enacts a statute which says "no Baptist may take
an appeal to the Supreme Court." That would be wrong and obvi7. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. While the fifth amendment by its terms
imposes no requirement of equal protection on the federal government, the
Supreme Court has construed that amendment's due process clause to impose
such an obligation. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
8. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).

1981-82]

SYMPOSIUM

PROCEEDINGS

1045

ously unconstitutional, not because article III, section 2 would
limit it, but because it, like every other law is subject to the prohibition in the first amendment and the free exercise clause.
PROF. BATOR:
Well, just a quick footnote. I would solve the
problem of Mr. Kay's hypothetical statute by saying that you would
go to state court to get section 1 invalidated. The state court
would have to, and should invalidate section 1. Then there would
be a severability problem which I would concentrate on.

MR. KAY: Professor Bator, is your answer to my question that
one has no constitutional guarantee to hear the section 1 case in a
federal court? If so, do we have a constitutional guarantee that a
state court is going to hear the case? Where is that?
PROF. BATOR: It is in the combination of the supremacy clause 9
with the general jurisdiction of the state courts to decide the case.
Nothing in article III gives Congress any power to prevent the
state courts from enforcing the Constitution. The state courts
have the power to invalidate an act of Congress as unconstitutional.
That point is really central. When a state court hears a case, it
must declare unconstitutional legislation which is invalid under
the Constitution. The Congress cannot prevent a state court from
exercising that constitutional power.
PROF. RATNER: I would just like to add one additional thing
to Professor Bator's remarks. First, if we have a constitutional
system of judicial review, the only way it can work is if there is
access to the courts. If Congress can cut off all access to the courts,
you have no judicial review. If Congress cut off access to all federal
courts and to all state courts, you have no remedy for constitutional
violations. In addition to that, there is indication in the cases, the
Battaglia10 case among others, that there are due process questions.
If you claim that what is being done to you is contrary to the Constitution, you are entitled to a hearing. There must be some
tribunal in which you can assert the constitutional claim. If

9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
10. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948).
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Congress cuts off the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the state
courts remain and always have remained able to adjudicate that
claim. There is no doubt about that. If Congress then also cuts
off the jurisdiction of the state courts, there is no tribunal at all.
You are denied an opportunity to be heard on a constitutional issue.
If you were talking about ordinary statutory policy, Congress might
modify that policy in various ways through control of federal and
state court jurisdiction. But when you are talking about constitutional claims, the due process clause" requires that there remain
a tribunal available in which you may be heard. Thus, the due
process clause is a limitation on congressional power over judicial
jurisdiction.
JUDGE SLOVITER: Of course, there is a question as to whether
Congress can cut off the jurisdiction of the state courts. You
assume that Congress cannot and I think Professor Bator's assumption is also that they cannot. At least I think he said so. Professor
Redish wanted to say something about Professor Bator's comments.

PROF. REDISH: I agree with Professor Bator that the ultimate
answer to Mr. Kay's hypothetical is that the state courts have a
general jurisdiction. They are required to enforce any constitutional matter and they cannot be shut off constitutionally by Congress. But that raises more important issues to me that I would
like to address.
I was very troubled by Dr. McClellan's statement and to some
extent by Professor Rice's because I think there is something of an
inconsistency in the arguments of the anti-federal courts wing of
the profession. On the one hand, in cases like Younger v. Harris12
and the line that flows from it, it is suggested that any intimation
that the state courts will not be as equally enthusiastic as the federal
courts, or as equally competent as the federal courts in enforcing
federal constitutional rights, is somehow a tremendous insult to
the state courts that has to be avoided. Federal courts and state
courts are for all practical purposes assumed to be fungible. And
as a technical, historical, constitutional matter, I agree with Professor Bator that that is true. I think we part company after that.
Yet people like Professor Rice and Dr. McClellan are arguing that
the very reason for shutting off federal court jurisdiction is to allow
the state courts to not do what the federal courts would do. I
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

The due process clause provides: No person

. . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. Id.
12. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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would think that there is an inconsistency in their position and I
would like to have an explanation.
DR. MCCLELLAN: Well, there is one inconsistency on the other

side too and it has cropped up during this discussion. It also
appears in the literature on this subject. On the one hand, it is
claimed that if we deny federal court jurisdiction over a particular
class of cases that we are going to produce a problem in uniformity.
At the same time, those who oppose the use of the exceptions clause
power argue that if we deny jurisdiction over the federal courts,
we are going to freeze existing constitutional law and that the state
courts would have no opportunity to depart from existing decisions
by the Supreme Court. This latter view is based on the erroneous
doctrine of judicial supremacy. It seems to me that state judges
are free to disregard a Supreme Court decision if the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction over that class of cases, even though the
decision may be on the books. It is not clear to me why a state
court judge today, after the Supreme Court's jurisdiction has been
divested, would have to follow a prior Supreme Court decision.
When the federal courts hand down a decision, or for that matter
any court, the decision applies only to the parties in the action.
The courts do not have the legislative power required to cast a
general net over their decisions which would make them apply to
all persons.
JUDGE

SLOVITER:

supremacy clause.
PROF. REDISH:

Well, implicated

here

is obviously

the

Professor Redish.
First of all, I would say that the assumption of

the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris13 is woefully inaccurate.

I would agree with Dr. McClellan that the state courts, as a practical matter and not in a technical, constitutional sense, are just
not fungible with the federal courts. They will not give you the
same justice in interpreting federal rights as the federal courts.
Indeed, I am saying that is the very purpose for these proposed
limitations on federal court jurisdiction.
I think it is just preposterous to suggest that somehow the
state courts are freed from an obligation to enforce Supreme Court
precedent once the Supreme Court no longer has jurisdiction. The
state courts are bound by the supremacy clause to obey federal law.
The Constitution is federal law and in Marbury v. Madison 14 the
13. Id.
14. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

1048

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27: p. 1042

Supreme Court settled that its interpretations of the Constitution
are final. You put those two together and there is no logic for
saying that an exercise of Congress' power under the exceptions
clause somehow frees the state court from any legal or moral obligation to enforce pre-existing Supreme Court precedent.
DR. MCCLELLAN: I would just say quite hastily here that the

supremacy clause does not include the phrase "rules or decisions of
the Supreme Court." 15
I am reading the
PROF. REDISH: Marbury v. Madison does.
two together, the supremacy clause combined with Marbury.
You are equating Marbury with the su-

DR. MCCLELLAN:

premacy clause?
PROF. REDISH:

Yes.

DR. MCCLELLAN: Well, I would argue against that proposition
because in Marbury, John Marshall very clearly said in defense of
judicial review that he was protecting the judicial branch only
against an act of Congress. He nowhere said in that case or in any
other case that the Supreme Court's decision should be viewed as
the "supreme law of the land." That kind of rhetoric does not
appear in the Supreme Court reports until 1958, when the Court
declared in Cooper v. Aaron 16 that its interpretation of the Constitution was identical with the words of the Constitution itself and
was therefore the supreme law of the land.
PROF. REDISH:

I can see that our interpretations of history

differ.
JUDGE

SLOVITER:

Professor Bator, resolve this.

PROF. BATOR:
I think that even if there were not a supremacy
clause, it would be an incoherent account of the legal system that
says that the decisions of the highest court of the government whose
law is being interpreted, should not be seen as an authoritative
source of law in subsequent cases being litigated in a different
jurisdiction.
Suppose we had a case in Utah, and the Utah court had to
decide what was the law of Vermont. Assume that under the
applicable conflicts rule, it is the law of Vermont that governs.
Assume that there is a clear precedent in the Supreme Court of

15. For the text of the supremacy clause, see note 9 supra.
16. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Vermont and the Supreme Court of Utah knows what that precedent is. Now, the Supreme Court of Vermont does not have jurisdiction to review or reverse the Supreme Court of Utah on what
is the law of Vermont. But it would seem to be an incoherent
account of the legal system for the Utah court to say: "What we
are doing is announcing the law of Vermont but we are departing
from the Vermont Supreme Court's conclusion as to what the law
of Vermont is." It would be the same kind of incoherence that
undermined the regime of Swift v. Tyson. 17 In the end it is not
a manageable or coherent or an intelligible way to run a judicial
system.
I find this last argument very interesting because what it really says is that we need the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. That is what this argument really comes
down to. It is clear that we have a supremacy clause, and notice
the supremacy clause says that the courts of the states are bound by
the Constitution. It says that "the Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; ...
any Thing in the Constitution and Laws of each State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 18
First, the state courts are bound by the Constitution. State
judges also take an oath, as do all judges to support the Constitution. One would suppose that in deciding cases, each judge must
look at that Constitution and interpret. It is true that they look
at the decisions of other courts, and they are bound by the decisions of higher courts. The reason they are bound is because
they are subject to the appellate review of those higher courts. It
is the authority of the higher court to reverse that makes the lower
court bound or at least strongly obliged to follow the higher court.
Even then, it is not quite clear how rigidly the state courts are
bound. Some courts have indicated that the duty of the lower
courts is to decide what the higher court would decide now. And
if a lower court thinks that the Supreme Court would not now
decide what it previously decided, the lower court might say, "I
don't think that is any longer Supreme Court doctrine and if I
am wrong, the Supreme Court will reverse me."
However, the question of the extent to which lower courts are
bound by appellate decisions is of course decided as a practical
matter. Because of this appellate review, they must follow the deciPROF. RATNER:

17. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, c. 2.
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sions of the higher courts very closely. Take away appellate review
and you no longer have any institutional controls. What you have
left is an obligation of the judge-his solemn obligation to follow
the Constitution. When you take away the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, you designate those lower courts as supreme
courts and you tell them "do what you think is right under the
Constitution, because you are no longer subject to appellate review
by the Supreme Court." And it is the Congress of the United
States that tells them that.
Under those circumstances, it is by no means clear to me that
those lower federal courts or state courts must follow prior decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Particularly
when these decisions may or may not be followed by the present
Supreme Court which has in the meantime changed in personnel
and perhaps ideology.
In addition to this, we are now assuming that Congress has
power under the exceptions and regulations clause to take away
Supreme Court jurisdiction. So, I am now basing my discussion
on that assumption. Under that assumption, what is the purpose
behind that plenary power to remove the Court's jurisdiction? It
is a check on the broad power of the Court to declare legislative
and executive actions unconstitutional. That is the reason. But
if we accept that Congress has this check, what happens when Congress says: "We do not agree with what the Supreme Court is doing, therefore, we are going to exercise our check. We are going
to take away the Court's authority and confer it upon other courts.
Those other courts should now in accordance with their conscience
and their oaths make their own decisions with regard to the
Constitution."
If you make that assumption about Congress' power under the
exceptions and regulations clause, I have great difficulty in seeing
how you can then turn around and say that the very courts who
have been given the authority of last resort must now follow prior
decisions of the Supreme Court which Congress has "checked"-and
we assume has checked constitutionally. There is nothing in the
Constitution that makes stare decisis a constitutional doctrine. It
is appellate jurisdiction that binds.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,19 Cohens v. Virginia,20 and Ableman v. Booth,2 ' the Supreme Court said if you take away the appel19. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
20. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
21. 62 U.S. (21 Harv.) 506 (1859).
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late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the state courts, the
state courts will do what they want. Clearly, the Supreme Court
seemed to think that under these circumstances the state courts
would not be bound by a prior decision of the United States
Supreme Court.
PROF. RICE: I think we are getting off into a never-never land
here which is increasingly unrelated to what the Constitution really
does. The underlying assumption here is the assumption I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks. The organized bar assumes
implicitly that Supreme Court decisions themselves have the rank
and the order of the language of the Constitution. Indeed, that
the language of Supreme Court opinions have virtually the same
rank and order as the language of the Constitution. It is an
assumption of judicial supremacy and exclusivity which is at war
with what the Constitution was intended to do. It involves an
assumption that no decision by the Supreme Court can ever be
unconstitutional. Think about that. That is really the assumption.
No decision by the Supreme Court can ever be unconstitutional.
Let's take the worst case-the Dred Scott 22 decision in 1857.
Part of the purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to overrule
that decision. The Supreme Court in Dred Scott enunciated in
dicta the principle that human beings, slaves, were not persons,
could not be persons-were property. They could not be citizens.
Their descendants could not be citizens.
Now, let's consider a theoretical worst case. Suppose the
Supreme Court today were to come out and say: "Folks, we have
reconsidered our position and we think that the concept enunciated
in Dred Scott was right-that Blacks, the descendants of slaves, are
non-persons." Are you going to tell me that this decision is constitutional? Could anybody in his right mind propose that the
state courts would have to rubber stamp that, and say, "well, the
Supreme Court has spoken." I think that is patently ridiculous.
But in fact, in the issues that are involved in jurisdiction limiting
legislation, this is the problem. The situations are exactly alike.
In Roe v. Wade,23 the Court said: "Whether or not the unborn
child is a human being, he is a non-person." What bothers me
about this whole discussion is that one of the areas that we are
talking about-the removal of jurisdiction in the abortion areainvolves a Supreme Court decision which held that the offspring
22. 60 U.S. (19 Harv.) 393 (1857).

23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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That is really Roe v. Wade's

leading concept.
I believe fifty years from now, law review articles will be written expressing wonderment and surprise that the legal profession
at this time stood still and not only accepted this interpretation of
personhood-that human beings can be defined as non-persons-but
actually supported it. It seems to me that it is crucially important
to realize that it is possible to have an unconstitutional Supreme
Court decision. This is exactly the purpose behind article III,
section 2. As the Supreme Court said in Klein,24 article III, section 2 is designed to give Congress the power, to remove such cases
as to Congress may seem expedient. To delve into some kind of
never-never land analysis of what you would like the Constitution
to be is unrealistic because that is what article III, section 2 does.
You see what is involved in this controversy is the implicit assumption that the Supreme Court can never, alone of all the branches,
do anything unconstitutional.
JUDGE

SLOVITER: Mr. Kay, can a Supreme Court decision be

unconstitutional-at least until the Supreme Court itself says it was?
MR. KAY: I think that we can all agree that there are Supreme

Court decisions which some of us consider to be unconstitutional.
I think that that is totally beside the point. However, I think that
Professor Rice's use of the Dred Scott decision is a good example.
Dred Scott did involve a personhood issue. Now, to some in our
society, the crisis that was created by Roe v. Wade is not dissimilar
in that regard. However, the exceptions clause power was not
exercised in response to the Dred Scott decision. The fourteenth
amendment was enacted to overturn Dred Scott.
The fact is that there are significant drawbacks in utilizing the
court jurisdiction removal device, and since we are talking about
it, of utilizing section five of the fourteenth amendment,m to try

to overturn the impact of a Supreme Court decision by simple
statute.

The point that we keep losing here, the reason we are

really here, is not because this is an interesting constitutional
dialogue. It is because there are several major constituencies in
this country who want to overturn Supreme Court decisions and

have not been able to pass constitutional amendments.

If they had

24. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."

Id.
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been able to do so, this discussion would be moot. Therefore, I
think we really need to look at what is at stake here. The issue
is whether we want to redesign the way we have traditionally responded to the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court. That
is what is at stake. The bar is not talking about Roe v. Wade.
The bar is talking about process and the process that we have used
in this country up until now does not allow fifty-one percent of the
House, fifty-one percent of the Senate, and a presidential signature
to overturn the weight of a Supreme Court decision. That is what
is being advocated and so in my opinion that is what we really
ought to be focusing on.
PROF. RICE: Judge, may I mention two things and clear up
the point that Mr. Kay made? In my opinion, the reason why the
article III, section 2 power was not used to rectify Dred Scott was
that by the time Congress decided to do something about it, the
Civil War had been won. Congress did not have to use article III,
section 2. Secondly, if we could tomorrow enact a constitutional
amendment outlawing abortions, I think that for various reasons it
would be a more appropriate remedy.
MR. KAY: Well, the sixteenth amendment is another example
of a decision which was overturned by constitutional amendment.*
Yet there was discussion among members of Congress and even with
President Taft as to whether or not a simple statute ought to be
used in lieu of the amendment. However, the statutory approach
was rejected because it runs the kinds of risks that we have been
discussing.
PROF. RICE:

That is a better example.

JUDGE SLOVITER: Of course, there is a certain nonpermanence
to using the legislative route because as soon as fifty-one percent of
the House and fifty-one percent of the Senate change their views,
then you may very well have a reversal and you will have a ping
pong effect. Professor Redish.

It is amazing to me how people on both sides
of this debate disregard the constitutional language that we are
PROF. REDISH:

26. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI. In 1895, a sharply divided Supreme Court
in Pollack v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), held that an
income tax was a direct tax, which, under article I, sections 2 and 9 of the
federal Constitution, required apportionment among the states on the basis
of population. The sixteenth amendment, which was ratified on February 28,
1913, provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever sources derived, without regard to any census or
enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.

1054

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27: p. 1042

interpreting. The Constitution does not say, "Congress may overrule a Supreme Court decision." I have no doubt that if Congress
passed a law explicitly overruling a Supreme Court decision, that
law would be held unconstitutional as a violation of separation of
powers. What the Constitution provides is that Congress can curb
jurisdiction. It does not enable the Congress to overturn substantive doctrine.
I think it is interesting that Professor Rice on the one hand,
talks about our being in a never-never land and on the other hand,
he discusses the hypothetical possibility that after the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court would reaffirm Dred Scott. This
argument about an imperial Supreme Court that somehow imposes
minority values which are violently inconsistent with the overwhelming social fabric of our society simply has not happened. As
decisions have come down like that over the years, the Court has,
through processes I do not fully understand, been able to finesse
the problem either by reflection, reconsideration or change in personnel-without seriously undermining the Court's function as the
primary guarantor of minority rights. I would think that any use
of the exceptions clause power, even though I do read it for what
it says in the Constitution, other than in a purely housekeeping
fashion, is likely to upset the delicate balance that we have established in this country.
JUDGE

SLOVITER:

I wonder if I can shift for a minute to the

inferior federal courts, as some of us here are interested in them.
I would like to ask Professor Bator a question. By your suggestion
that the state courts rather than the inferior federal courts should
be the front line for section 1983 suits,2 7 aren't you necessarily

eliminating federal court consideration of all fourteenth amendment cases in light of the effect of collateral estoppel which, unlike
habeas corpus, applies to 1983 suits?
PROF. BATOR:
Yes, I think that is correct. If we tried it, if
we shifted 1983 litigation to a system which said that you have to
show that the state court remedy was inadequate before resorting

27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
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to 1983, then it would be the case that collateral estoppel would
come into play and could prevent later relitigation of the federal
constitutional question. However, collateral estoppel could be
overcome by a showing that the state court system would not afford
a full opportunity to have a hearing.
JUDGE SLOVITER: So that what we really have is not a front
line. I mean, I think that it is a misnomer to talk about the state
courts as being in the front line of section 1983 adjudication.

Yes, I am not talking only about postponing
federal court jurisdiction. I am talking about using federal jurisdiction as a backstop in cases where there has been a failure in state
court process.
PROF. BATOR:

PROF. REDISH: I thought that I would like to ask a few questions of Professor Bator on this particular point if I could. First,
I would like to know how you feel about the civil rights removal
legislation which as drafted virtually says what you have said. If
you can show there is an inadequate remedy in state court, you
would be allowed to remove. However, the Supreme Court has
refused to allow anyone to make that kind of jump.
Secondly, do you think there would be serious dangers in terms
of creating friction in federalism to allow, authorize, and require
federal courts to inquire into the good faith or competency of the
state courts? And finally, do you think it would be that easy as
a matter of proof to establish as a preliminary matter the inadequacy of the state courts, even if it were in fact the case?
PROF. BATOR: You clearly would run into all kinds of problems. But what we are discussing now is a side question about
section 1983 and a lot of other subjects, and I don't think we have
an adequate basis to discuss them.
JUDGE SLOVITER:
All right then, we will let you get your
whacks in at Professor Ratner now.
PROF. BATOR: I think it would be interesting to know what
would be the effect, both in theory and in practice, if we did what
Professor Rice wants us to do. Professor Rice advocates that a
given class of constitutional litigation should go to the state courts
with the final decision being made by the state courts; there would
be no Supreme Court review. It seems to me that Professor Rice
and Professor Ratner have sort of struck up a holy or unholy alliance and are confusing us about what the effect of that situation
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would be. Professor Ratner is plainly right that the empirical
effect of such a Supreme Court divestiture eventually would be to
create or to put pressure in favor of disunity. That is, this structure would create a centripetal force, which would drive things out
from the center. The reason for this is that new cases will come
along that are not simply repetitions of prior cases and present
questions that cannot be answered simply by citing to old Supreme
Court decisions. The question is, then, what will happen in going
from the old law to new cases where there is no Supreme Court
review. The effect will obviously be to create disunity. The pressure in a legal system should be towards the working out of things
on a uniform basis; that is how the system is arranged today. That
is why I think it would be a very bad, whacky and totally unacceptable system to have no Supreme Court review.
But all that is a very different question than the question of
the continuing authoritativeness of such Supreme Court decisions
which do exist on the issue and which have relevance in a particular case confronting a state court. Authoritativeness does not depend on jurisdiction to review. It is an incoherent account of the
legal system that says that the authoritativeness of a pronouncement
of a court depends on that court's jurisdiction to review or reverse
another court in some future case.
I would like now to turn to Professor Ratner's methodology
in constitutional interpretation. His basic position is: "Look, once
we take away the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, we would have all
this potential disuniformity and there would also be at least the
opportunity for the state courts to disregard the Supreme Court.
Should a state court decide to ignore a Supreme Court decision,
there is basically nothing that you can do about it. That is a bad
system, and after all, we have this wonderful, perfect Constitution
and how can we think that the Framers created such a system? The
Constitution cannot be read as 'stultifying' itself." That basically
is his case for his reading of the exceptions clause.
Professor Ratner's theory seems to me to be unsatisfactory in
a very fundamental way. He says that "checks" on the Supreme
Court are acceptable provided that they do not "stultify." But
Professor Ratner does not tell us what the difference is between
checks and stultification. He said, for instance, that it is merely a
"check" on the Supreme Court that the President and the Senate,
acting together, can pack the Court. But what tells us that this
"check" is not a stultification? In the 1930's it was thought to be
a major stultification of judicial independence and separation of

1981-82]

SYMPOSIUM

PROCEEDINGS

1057

powers to think that the Constitution permits such a plan.2" Do
you suppose that if the President and the Senate appoint fifty new
Supreme Court justices it would not be a stultification? The fact
is one cannot find in the constitution guarantees against its own
stultification.
If we had a President who was very popular and had majoritarian support, and this President was reelected, and reelected, and
reelected, and reelected, he could dissolve the Supreme Court very
easily, legally, and constitutionally. He would just fail to make
appointments to the Court until all the justices died. Now that is
stultification, right? We would have no Supreme Court.
This act would certainly be anti-constitutional in spirit. However, it is perfectly clear that there is no account of the Constitution
which says that the President has no power to do it. The trouble
with the Ratner method is that it assumes that the Constitution
contains within itself all the necessary guarantees to prevent the
system's collapse or from somehow going awry in a fundamental
way. I do not think that any document can do that or do it completely with absolute "internal" guarantees.
Therefore, even though I think that the exceptions clause in
its nature creates the possibility of a very incoherent and possibly
unacceptable system, I nevertheless think its fair reading is just
that. That is the danger it creates and we have to live with it. I
think that we should realize this and then try to persuade people
that it would create a lousy system of government to use the clause.
PROF. RATNER: First, of course the Constitution is not the
hypothetical utopian document that Professor Hart referred to 29
and we will never get it. It does not contain everything. But time
has shown how important the Supreme Court is to the plan of the
Constitution. The Court's role is an aspect of the system that
provides efficiency and flexibility. When the Court is called upon
to interpret the various clauses, it may ask itself: "What is the overriding constitutional plan? What are the goals?"
Thus, the Court may appropriately interpret these ambiguous
phrases which do not contain explicit statements about all the
kinds of protections that may be implicit in the plan. And that is
why constitutions have to be ambiguous. Ambiguity is an essential
of a constitution. John Marshall cautioned: "Remember, it is a
28. Stern, The CommeTce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946,
59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 681-82 (1946).

29. Hart, supra note 3, at 1372.
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Constitutionwe are interpreting; not the Internal Revenue Code." 30
(He didn't say the last part, I did.) The Constitution must live for
generations. It must be applied to new situations. Therefore, in
interpreting the ambiguities of the broad phrases, when the Court is
looking for the overriding goals, it may fill in the gaps. Of course,
there are gaps.
Now, with regard to the authoritativeness of prior decisions, I
am not sure what that word means, but I do not mean to imply
that the prior decisions are not relevant and may not be persuasive.
Of course the state courts or any courts may, and I assume will, look
at the prior Supreme Court decisions. I would like to add emphatically that I am now making the assumption that Congress could
exercise the exceptions power in a way that would totally divest the
Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction. I do not agree that it
can, but I am making the assumption.
The state courts might be persuaded by these prior Supreme
Court decisions. They might be persuaded because of the fact that
they are Supreme Court decisions. That is a kind of authoritativeness, but it is not compelled. It is not controlling, and in fact, in
the long run, that is all you can say about any court decision. It
must in the final analysis persuade, or it will wither away and die.
With regard to the difference between checks and stultification,
true, those words are only labels. We use them as generalizations
and they cannot precisely delineate all the applications. That is
what general terms are for. However, I will try to give you some
examples. I will try to apply them to Professor Bator's examples.
The test, as I have tried to indicate, is "does the Congressional
action, or whatever the government action is, impair the essential
functions of the Court?" I have tried to delineate what those
essential functions are in general terms. I think that they are
workable in terms of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of
the Constitution and federal law, so that we have one Constitution
for all of the country and federal supremacy when there is conflict
with state law.
Now, let us take the increase in the size of the Court. I think
Professor Bator asked why that isn't stultification, and I will try
to show you why it is not stultification. I suggest that it does not
impair either of the essential functions. It does not prevent the
Supreme Court from acting as the apex court of last resort in order
to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and federal law when
a state statute is brought before it. It does not prevent the Supreme
30. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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Court from maintaining uniformity. You may say: "But there has
been an increase in the size of the Court-have not the majoritarian
political branches stepped in and controlled the decision?" However, note that uniformity and supremacy are still being implemented. And consider how this process works. Congress must
first pass a statute to increase the size of the Court. The President,
of course, can not do it on his own. That statute must go through
the political process. So we assume that Congress is mad enough
to pass a statute that authorizes appointments to increase the size
of the Court. I may remind you that back in the thirties, it was
President Roosevelt who wanted to increase the size of the Court
and the Congress who would not do it. See how this check works?
The Congress would not increase the Court's size. However, now
we assume that Congress does it. But what do they do? They
simply give the President the authority to appoint. The President
must make the choice. He must choose who is going to be on that
Court but, just a minute, he does not quite choose by himself. He
has to go back to the Senate to get their approval of his choice. In
the operation of those political institutions and the accommodations
that must take place, you do not have a stultification of the Court's
function at all, and particularly not of the essential functions. The
President does not know who he is going to get on the Supreme
Court. He knows their names, but he does not really know how
they are going to decide. You continue to have an independent
Supreme Court that will maintain the uniformity and supremacy
of federal law regardless-maybe not regardless-of whatever the
President and Congress have done. They have an input. Of course,
they have an input. They have a check. If they go that far, they
have made known how they feel and that is appropriate. And that
is the way the system works. Thus, if the size of the Court is increased, it is a check-not a stultification.
I agree that there is some point at which, if the size of the
Court is increased enormously, it ceases to be a Court in the mold
that the Constitution and our institutions envision. I guess if you
increased the size of the Court by fifty or a hundred Justices you
could talk about stultification. But I am not sure. But surely not
fifteen or twenty Justices.
Now, suppose the President refuses to make any appointments?
Well, wait a minute, he only has a four-year term and if the country
does not like what he is doing, he is not going to be there for
more than four years. And, all the Justices are not going to die in
four years or in eight years. Furthermore, Congress can impeach
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the President and that is a big check on him. If the President
wants to stultify the Court, he can not do it in two terms. And if
he could, Congress could impeach him. The Court could be ultimately destroyed in this manner only if the Congress, more than
one president, and a continuing majority of the electorate wanted
to do so. And a constitutional crisis would then be created. There
are your checks. You do not have to take away the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which really undermines judicial
review, protection of minorities, and the functions of an apex court.
I do not know whether there are other examples but, I suggest to
you, that is the way the system works. And that is the way the
system ought to work. It is a good system. We do not need to
destroy that system by taking away from the one constitutionally
created court the essential functions that make the system work.
JUDGE SLOVITER: Professor Rice wanted to comment and after
that I think I would like to open up the discussion for questions
from the floor. As you can see, the panel can go on indefinitely
and maybe some persons in the audience have questions.

RICE: Just to answer Professor Ratner's remarks, if
neither the Senate nor the President knows how the new appointee
to the Supreme Court is going to decide cases, how is the appointment of new Justices a remedy for a decision you do not like? The
first thing I would like to mention is what Professor Redish has
said. He brought up a good point. When I mentioned the Dred
Scott case, he said that is a sort of never-never land. It is, sure.
The Supreme Court coming in and re-affirming the Dred Scott
decision, now that is quite inconceivable. But Roe v. Wade is not.
And Roe v. Wade is based on precisely the same principle, that
whether or not the unborn child is a human being, he is a nonperson. It is precisely the same principle as Dred Scott where a
human being, a slave, was defined as a non-person. Roe v. Wade
is serious business. We get all excited about Jonestown when 900
people committed suicide or were murdered. And yet we forget
that by legalizing abortion, every seven hours of every day, we
duplicate the death toll at Jonestown. In human terms, legalized
abortion is a catastrophe. It is a dishonor to the legal profession
that the organized bar is so unconcerned about it.
I just would want to make another comment-it is sort of
repetitive-but I think it is important to make it. Article III,
section 2 is itself part of the system of checks and balances. It is a
reflection of the fact that judicial supremacy was not intended by
PROF.
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the Constitution. There is, incidentally, also a fundamental right
to the maintenance of a system of checks and balances. I think
that any fair reading of what the Supreme Court has said, especially
on the meaning of article III would indicate that article III is a
rather important part of that system of checks and balances.
Therefore, we have to ask ourselves these questions: "Is it
possible for a Supreme Court decision to be contrary to what the
Constitution intends?" The answer is obviously "yes."
Then
what remedies are there? I suggest that the use of the exceptions
clause is one. Maybe it is not the remedy of choice. Maybe it is
not the best remedy. There are certainly other remedies: statutory
qualification, constitutional amendment, and so on. But it is a
remedy.
JUDGE SLOVITER: Are there any questions or have all your questions been answered?
AUDIENCE: I would like to direct a question to Professor Redish
with an anticipated response from Professor Rice. I think the
most interesting issue that has been raised today is the external
limitation on the exceptions clause found in the implied equal
protection provision of the fifth amendment. I was surprised that
Professor Redish and Professor Rice agreed to a considerable extent
on this question. Both agree that legislation excepting Blacks from
appeals to the Supreme Court would be unconstitutional. Professor Rice raised the question of an exception for Baptists. I presume that if the Unification Church were singled out for an
exception to Supreme Court appellate court jurisdiction, your
position would be the same. I want to address a question to Professor Redish and perhaps give him an opportunity to develop his
view concerning the scope of the fifth amendment equal protection
guarantee.
You argue that given the unconstitutionality of an explicit
racial exception to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, it is likely
that legislation curbing Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in
racial segregation and busing cases would also be unconstitutional.
This would be so because such legislation removes rights almost
exclusively asserted by Blacks from review and thus is a suspect
classification that triggers rigid scrutiny. But would not legislation
excepting school prayer or abortion cases from Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction raise serious constitutional questions on the
basis of the fundamental interest branch of equal protection that
also triggers rigid judicial scrutiny? Don't you give up on the
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fundamental interest limitation too easily? Specifically, wouldn't
the equal protection aspect of the Court's decision in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley 31 provide a basis for an equal protection
attack on these jurisdiction limiting bills?
PROF. REDISH: You raise an excellent question because it really

gets to the fundamental issues about equal protection and how they
apply here. I think in theory, the abortion cases might be similar
to the school desegregation cases because under Roe v. Wade a
right to an abortion can only biologically be asserted by a woman.
While sex discrimination has not received the strict scrutiny of
racial discrimination, it has received sort of a twilight zone kind
of strict scrutiny. So theoretically, racial and sexual discrimination
would be treated similarly. As a practical matter, however, while
the Court has recognized neutral limitations which disproportionately impact on Blacks as raising equal protection problems,
the Court has not recognized seemingly neutral limitations which
have an inescapable effect on women as sexual classification. In
the abortion equal protection cases, Harris v. McRae 32 and Maher
v. Roe,33 you would think the Court could have easily said: "Well,
these are regulations affecting the right to an abortion which can
only be exercised by a woman, therefore, this is a sexual discrimination." However, the Court didn't say it.
I think there is no equal protection problem in limiting jurisdiction to review school prayer cases because in these cases there is
not a unique, well defined, insular minority that uses that right.
You suggest that the equal protection analysis of Mosley might
be relevant to selective jurisdictional limitations. In Mosley the
Supreme Court combined the first amendment and equal protection
to say that a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing near a school,
with an exemption for labor picketing, violated equal protection
because it affected a fundamental (first amendment) right. A
possible argument under Mosley would be: "Is not the constitutionality of a bill affecting school prayer the same issue as in Mosley
because some people want to take advantage of school prayer and
31. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting all picketing near schools
during school hours except labor picketing violated equal protection clause in
that it made impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other
peaceful picketing).
32. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Hyde amendment which prohibited the use of
federal funds to pay the costs of medically necessary abortions, does not
violate equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment).
33. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (no denial of equal protection where state refuses
to pay expenses of nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women).
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others do not?" However, I think that Mosley is distinguishable
because under the logic of Mosley, at least from the equal protection part of the decision, there would have been no unconstitutionality if Chicago had repassed the ordinance saying, "nobody
can picket near the school about anything." This would be true
even though the ordinance would have been affecting everybody's
first amendment right. Now, there might be a first amendment
violation, but it would not be an equal protection violation because
everybody is being treated equally-those who want to speak near
the school and those who do not want to speak near the school. I
think the same is true for the school prayer issue. There may be
some people who do object to a ban on school prayer and there are
others who do not. But there is no well defined group that has
been traditionally subjected to discrimination that would want to
take advantage of their status to challenge the ban. So, I do not
think that equal protection goes quite that far.
PROF. RICE: I agree, it is a very good question which would
be important where the removal of a class of cases impacted on a
clearly defined group. I think you may find the answer to the question would be found in the application of an intent, a purposeful
discrimination requirement rather than an effects test.
AUDIENCE:

Isn't the point of your example concerning the

Baptists that it is a discrimination against individuals because of
their religious beliefs and it is not a discrimination against a discrete

group?
PROF. RICE: No, I think there is a couple of things you could
say about that. First of all, where a statute provides that "no Baptist
shall take an appeal to the Supreme Court," there will be no appellate jurisdiction of cases where a Baptist was the appellant. You
have a criterion that has nothing to do with the authentic nature of
the case. But, you also have a clear, purposeful discrimination on
the basis of religion. You may find that this would be the way to
analyze the hypothetical.
You posit a very interesting question because clearly Congress
could not-I think just as in the commerce clause-Congress could
not say, "no Baptist can take an appeal." I do not think that they
can use covert language if that, in fact, is their purpose. I think
that is fairly well established. That does not bother me. That is
a limitation not arising out of any inherent limit of article III,
section 2, but out of the usual application of the constitutional
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restrictions based on equal protection and the Bill of Rights. The
purpose of the pending proposals would not be to impose such
invidious discrimination.
AUDIENCE:

Professor Rice, you state that you believe that the

United States Supreme Court which is sworn to uphold the Constitution, may come to an unconstitutional result. You cite Roe
v. Wade, as support for this proposition. Then at the same time
you say that it is proper to leave constitutional adjudication to the
state courts because they are sworn to uphold the Constitution.
Don't you find your position a little inconsistent?
PROF. RICE: Oh, they can make mistakes, too.
AUDIENCE: And they could make the same mistake as the
Supreme Court did in Roe v. Wade?
PROF. RICE: Sure, the state courts can make mistakes, too.
The question is whether when the Supreme Court makes a mistake, it is considered as if that mistake were written into the very
language of the Constitution. That is why Congress is given in
article III, section 2, this very strong, very broad power. I am not
saying state courts do not make mistakes. Of course, they do. And
you would have variant decisions on these cases. And, obviously
contradictory decisions cannot both be right. So, sure they can
make mistakes.
AUDIENCE:

Perhaps fifty mistakes.

Sure, anybody can make mistakes.
had a losing basketball season.
PROF. RICE:

DR. MCCLELLAN:

Notre Dame

I would like to add to this discussion Jus-

tice Brandeis' candid acknowledgement in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,8 4 that the Court's earlier decision in Swift v. Tyson,3 5 was
"unconstitutional."
AUDIENCE:

I am going to address my question to the entire

panel. I am interested in their reaction to Professor Bator's position on Congressional power over the so-called inferior courts.
More specifically, the actual human life bill 3 has as its jurisdictional provision, unless the language has been changed recently,
only the removal of jurisdiction from the lower federal courts. The
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
36. S. 2148, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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bill does not impair the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the state supreme courts. I wonder if anyone on
the panel would find that provision in the human life bill to be
unconstitutional. In other words, would you disagree with Professor Bator's position?
Secondarily, what do you think, if anything, and this is addressed primarily to Dr. McClellan and Professor Rice, would be
accomplished by removing the jurisdiction of the lower courts without removing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
DR.

MCCLELLAN:

AUDIENCE:

In reference to the human life bill?

Yes.

DR. MCCLELLAN: Well, the human life bill does not actually
take away jurisdiction of the federal courts. There is a provision
in the bill which requires accelerated review of the law by the
Supreme Court. So it is really not a typical jurisdictional regulation
bill. The primary purpose of the human life bill is to encourage
the Supreme Court to reexamine its findings in Roe v. Wade regarding personhood. In effect, what the human life bill does is to
ask the Supreme Court to take a second look at the scientific findings upon which it based its decision. That is really as far as it
goes. It really does not fit very neatly into the jurisdictional regulation problem, as the busing bills or other jurisdictional regulation
bills do. Does that answer your question?
MR. KAY: Now you will see why it is useful to have a member of the minority party here. There are many versions of the
human life statute. The first version of it, Senate Bill 158 37 on
which there was eight days of hearings, does remove lower federal
court jurisdiction. But Dr. McClellan is correct. The last version
of the human life bill, Senate Bill 2148,38 does not properly fit into
the jurisdictional issues which we are discussing today.
I am really glad, however, that you raised a question on Professor Bator's position because I think that it is important to realize
that his position on this issue is generally held to be correct. There
is general agreement that Congress has wide latitude to control the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. However, in practice,
many of these bills go far beyond a simple, neutral prospective
removal of lower federal court jurisdiction. Senate 158 is an example of a bill which only precludes lower federal court jurisdiction
37. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
38. S. 2148, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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to challenges to statutes that regulate or prohibit abortion. Senate
158 does not remove lower federal court jurisdiction to challenge
statutes which give the right to obtain an abortion. I think that
you can very effectively make an equal protection argument against
Senate 158 on this aspect of the bill. I am not sure how persuasive it is but it is persuasive to me. In effect, the bill keeps
out litigants on one side of the issue, while allowing them in if
they are proponents of the other side of the issue. Several constitutional scholars have raised serious constitutional concerns with
this kind of jurisdiction removal.
The other bill which concerns me is one of the busing bills,
Senate Bill 1647, 39 pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This bill would remove the lower federal court's contempt
power in busing cases and also give the lower court power to
automatically dissolve pending cases on the mere request of one of
the parties. Therefore, even if one conceded the constitutionality
of congressional attempts to remove these controversial issues from
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, there remain additional
constitutional problems with these bills. Many of these bills have
gone beyond the relatively narrow jurisdictional issue.
PROF. BATOR:

I think that I agree with what Mr. Kay says and

maybe I can put it in a somewhat more general way. In principle,
the starting point is that Congress is free to take a class of constitutional litigation and say: "It may not be initiated in the federal
courts and must be initiated in the state courts." But most of the
bills that I have seen contain all kinds of technical problems which
may land them in serious constitutional trouble. The point I am
making here is that exercising the power to curtail jurisdiction involves many severe technical problems. I can mention two examples. One is the problem that Professor Redish was touching
on. If the bill is drafted in such a way that it excluded a class of
claims which is congruent with a discrete class of persons, particularly an insular minority, then the bill runs into obvious equal
protection problems. Another technical difficulty arises if the court
is allowed to exercise jurisdiction, but there are specific exceptions
carved out of that jurisdiction for certain, narrowly defined questions. You may run afoul of the point that you can not on the
one hand give a court jurisdiction but on the other hand tell it that
it must decide the case in an unconstitutional way.
39. S. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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JUDGE SLOVITER: How about one or more remedies? You
were saying they carve out one or more questions, would you comment then on what would happen if Congress carved out one or
more remedies?
PROF. BATOR: The remedy issue is even more complicated.
It runs into a separate and complicated body of doctrine relating
to the mix of judicial and legislative remedies, and the scope of the
Congress' power under section five of the fourteenth amendment.
I would like to say one word on the question of what a bill
restricting lower court jurisdiction would accomplish. The relevant historical precedent is what was accomplished by the Tax
Injunction Act of 1937 40 and the Johnson Act of 1934. 41 These
bills left the Supreme Court untouched. They shifted litigation
initially to the state courts. Basically, these bills allow the state
courts to bring to bear a somewhat different perspective. The
state courts are conscientious and law abiding, as conscientious and
law abiding as most courts, including federal courts. But the state
courts do bring to bear a slightly different perspective in the development of constitutional law. Their perspective is a legitimate
one. I think what Congress had in mind in the Tax Injunction
Act is that in developing that branch of constitutional law, it would
be useful to have those courts look at the problem in the first
instance that are closest to the local scene. That is the legitimate
purpose such legislation can accomplish.

PROF. REDISH: This is where Professor Bator and I differ
significantly. It would seem to me that for the very reason that
state courts are closer to the local scene, they are not as adequate
a protector of federal rights-particularly against the exercise of
state authority. In Cook County, where I hang out, the thought
of a circuit judge holding unconstitutional a Chicago spying plan
is inconceivable. The judge knows that if he reaches such a decision, he is not going to get slated again and he did not get where
he is by being politically naive. Now there may be no overt statement of pressure, although in Chicago there probably would be,
but even if there were not, the subconscious pressure ...
40. Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). This Act provides that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." Id.
41. Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). This Act provides that "[t]he
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or
compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and
made by a state administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State
political subdivision." Id.
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Not in Philadelphia.
No, certainly not in Philadelphia.

The sub-

conscious pressures on the state judges is that there are potentially
graver consequences to their making an unpopular decision than
there would be for the federal judges. Of course, the federal judges
sit geographically in the same city or the same locale as the state
judges, but they are certainly insulated from state and federal political authority. So, when we are dealing with the protection of
minority rights against majority abuse, I do not think that it is an
advantage to be closer to the local authorities in the local scene.
AUDIENCE:
It seems as though the panel is starting to allude
to the independent judiciary theory of Professor Sager. 42 Sagar
says that because the state courts are so close to the local political
process and not independent in the sense that they are politically
elected, they really can not fairly adjudicate federal constitutional
rights. As such, there must be some kind of independent federal
judiciary to adjudicate those rights. Therefore, it would be unconstitutional to divest the jurisdiction of both the lower federal
courts and the Supreme Court. I would like the panel to respond
to Professor Sagar's view.
PROF. REDISH:
My reading of Professor Sager is slightly different, perhaps a difference in emphasis, but I think it is an important one. Professor Sager does not suggest, as my line of reasoning might lead you to, the conclusion that state courts are
inadequate protectors of constitutional rights vis-a-vis state authority. He is not arguing on a due process basis. He is arguing historically. He says, "The salary and tenure provision of article III
guarantees the availability of at least one article III court to review
constitutional rights." It is sort of a modification of Professor
Ratner's theory. It is like a floating essential functions thesis. You
can close off the Supreme Court, if you leave the lower federal
courts open. Or you can close off the lower federal courts, if you
leave the Supreme Court open. But you cannot close them both
off because to do so would violate the salary and tenure provision
in the Constitution.
As sympathetic as I am with that conclusion as a policy matter,
his history is just inaccurate. There is no indication that the
Framers viewed the situation that way. In fact, the whole Madi-

42. Sager, Forward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 61-68
(1981).
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sonian compromise which led to Congress' power to create or not
create the lower federal courts, recognized that the state courts could
be adequate protectors of federal constitutional rights. Although
I do not think that the Framer's conclusion is accurate today-it
was assumed by them at the time. I think also, you could read the
salary and tenure provision to say that if and when Congress used
its power to create the lower federal courts, those courts must be
independent. It is a kind of separation of powers argument. You
can exclude us completely, but if you use us, it is a quid pro quo.
You cannot get the stamp of approval of an article III court unless
those courts are truly independent. Therefore, if Sager had argued
on a due process basis and had limited his argument to state
courts vis-a-vis state authority, it would have been more persuasive
than his historical argument based on article III with broad application to state court review of Congressional legislation as well.
With regard to Professor Sager's proposal, I
agree with Professor Redish that it is a kind of floating essential
functions theory. The state courts have from the beginning of the
Republic performed the function of deciding federal question
cases. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to create the
lower federal courts, and it is generally agreed that the authority
to create includes the authority to control jurisdiction. So Congress may take away the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and
allow the state courts to decide initially all federal question cases.
However, Professor Sager raises a significant question. He says
that the state courts cannot perform that constitutional role effectively because they do not have the life tenure and salary protection
of federal judges. Therefore, there is a problem in returning to
the state courts the authority to make all initial constitutional
decisions by eliminating the lower federal courts.
If, however, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over
all constitutional decisions, including state court decisions, there is
no problem because the ultimate decision is made by a federal
court, which is protected by the tenure and salary provisions of
article III. In other words, the essential functions of the Supreme
Court are relevant here as well. As long as the Court continues to
perform them, there is no serious problem. The whole question
of Congressional power over the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts thus becomes less significant if the Supreme Court retains
its ultimate appellate authority. It is only if you take away the
Supreme Court's appellate authority in the essential cases that there
PROF. RATNER:
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arises a really very difficult question concerning final constitutional
decisions by courts that are not shielded from political pressures by
the article III protections. That brings us back to what I suggest
is the central issue. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is the linchpin of the system.
I would like to take on the general proposition
is
always
better
to rely on the federal rather than the state
that it
courts in interpreting and enforcing the federal Constitution. That
is a complicated issue and arises in a lot of different settings. I
think to deal with it as a kind of a one shot, "all federal judges
versus all state judges and who is more sensitive to the constitution," is a little bit misleading. The problem cannot be solved
by war stories about what happened once in Cook County in Chicago. There are war stories about all kinds of judges. For one
thing, the correct comparison here is not just between state trial
judges on the one hand and the federal court system on the other.
What we have to fold into the picture is all of the state courts,
including state appellate and supreme courts. You are saying that
within the entire hierarchy of the state court system you will inevitably find total incompetence, insensitivity, politicization and
lack of independence. This proposition is empirically very hard
to support.
Another trouble with this proposition is that it proves too
much. If the proposition is true, then the strongest case for immediate federal trial court intervention is not when we have a plaintiff
with a constitutional claim, but when a defendant is sued or indicted in a state court proceeding. This notion that state courts
are somehow deficient is really an argument for total wholesale
removal-automatic removal whenever there is a federal defense.
The third trouble with this theory of the state courts lies in
the assertion that the federal judiciary is somehow more sensitive
to constitutional values and, therefore, federal courts are constitutionally and psychologically a better forum. This argument always
assumes that there are only certain sorts of constitutional values.
The examples used are always examples about individual liberties
against state power. You say: "The state judges will be biased in
favor of state power and less sensitive to issues involving individual
liberty." But if you look at this kind of litigation, you will see
that there are constitutional values on both sides. That is, the
argument that the federal Constitution leaves the state free to act
as it wishes, that the federal Constitution does not impose coercion
PROF. BATOR:
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on the state, is itself the assertion of a constitutional value. There
are constitutional values behind structural claims, such as separation of powers and federalism itself. There are sensitivities to
certain kinds of values coming from the state courts that are valuable and themselves reflect constitutional values and were intended
to be part of the structure of the Constitution.
We have time for one more question. We
have not taken a question from a student or a female for a while.
I have to do that.
JUDGE SLOVITER:

AUDIENCE: Professor Bator, I am an attorney for the county
solicitor and I am constantly frustrated by the feeling that we get
in federal court that somehow the state courts are less likely to
consider the rights of the individual as compared with the federal
courts. Where does that attitude come from?
JUDGE SLOVITER: Professor Bator, she has directed that question
to you. I am not sure that you should be harnessed with that
view-but, where does it come from?
PROF. BATOR:

I am not sure how to respond to that question.

JUDGE SLOVITER:

Would you like to answer that, Professor

Redish?
PROF. REDISH: Well, I did want to make one comment. It
sounds to me that the question is a perfectly good example of why
we need the federal courts. The question I think, is openly suggesting or acknowledging, that if she had been in a state court, she
would not have been receiving the kind of strict scrutiny that she
received in federal courts. I think that just goes further to undermine the assumption of fungibility that the Supreme Court has
engaged in in Younger between state and federal courts. You may
not like what the federal courts are doing. You may prefer what
the state courts are doing. But to suggest that they would be
equally enthusiastic and equally vigorous in enforcing constitutional rights is plainly incorrect.
JUDGE SLOVITER: I do not think that our panel expected me to
ask them to wrap up, but I will and I will do it in the reverse order
from which they originally spoke. So starting with Professor
Redish, we will have a one minute wrap up.

PROF. REDISH: I would like to make a statement on the issue
that Professor Bator and I have been discussing because I tend to
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agree with him that the Supreme Court jurisdiction issue while
intellectually fascinating, is quite probably more theoretical than
real. When we are fighting in the trenches and talking about the
trial forums, we have to remember that no matter how competent
state courts are, no matter what good faith they are acting in, their
primary obligation, burden, and duty is to interpret state law. Thus,
they simply cannot be expected to develop the kind of coherent
view of federal law that federal judges have. Keeping this fact in
mind, I agree that perhaps federal defenses should be allowed to be
raised in federal courts initially. There would be some exceptions.
Federalism prevents the immediate assertion of federal defenses in
a federal court when the defendant is being prosecuted on state
criminal charges. Such a right would unduly disrupt the state
judicial process. But that is why we have habeas corpus. Once the
state judicial process is completed, the federal court can review the
state trial proceedings. Therefore, I think it's unfortunate that the
Supreme Court in cases like Stone v. Powel143 has cut back so
dramatically on the role of the federal courts in habeas corpus once
the state proceedings are completed.
PROF. RATNER: I am not sure what "theoretical rather than
real" means. I suggest that the question of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction is a very real and important question that
underlies all these other questions. Perhaps, "more theoretical
rather than real" means that the Supreme Court has not yet had to
resolve the question. There has been a good deal of dicta. It has
been easy for the Supreme Court to say: "Sure, our jurisdiction is
determined by acts of Congress." But they have never had to
decide the issue of plenary control. Whether Congress has unlimited control over Supreme Court jurisdiction is a critical issue.
As long as the Supreme Court retains appellate jurisdiction, Congress can, with regard to the lower federal courts, exercise plenary
control over their jurisdiction, subject to other constitutional limits,
and Congress might appropriately return to the state courts some
of their historical authority as the courts of first instance in federal question cases. There are arguments on both sides of the
latter issue. As long as the Supreme Court retains appellate jurisdiction, the system will work either way. Congress can then exercise a great deal of discretion with regard to lower federal court
and state court federal-question jurisdiction. If you take away the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, however, the entire system
comes apart.
43. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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There have been constant attempts made to remove Supreme
Court jurisdiction since 1830. These attempts have not yet succeeded, but Congressional efforts are intensifying. Dissatisfaction
with the Supreme Court's substantive decisions is behind the efforts
to remove jurisdiction. I agree that a majoritarian safety valve is
needed. There must be checks on the Court. But removal of
jurisdiction is more than a check. It stultifies the Court's essential
constitutional role. This is the issue we had better confront while
there is still time.
PROF. RICE: I want to say first that I agree with Professor
Bator's general opinion of the state courts. I think his was a very
excellent analysis of the relevant positions of the state and federal
courts. One of the reasons, I suggest, for the current efforts in
Congress to remove federal court jurisdiction is that elitism that
has become ingrained in the federal judiciary. This is particularly
true with regard to the actions of the district courts in such matters
as racial balance and busing.
To shift gears for a moment, article III, section 2, is, of course,
part of the checks and balances system. It can hardly be said that
what the Supreme Court has consistently said on the subject is
merely casual dictum. We must remember Palko 44 and Twining 45
as the precedents under which we operated rather well with quite a
degree of flexibility among the states, as to the interpretation of the
Bill of Rights. And I offer the recommendation that if we do
anything as a result of this Symposium, we ought to reflect more
intently on those basic assumptions which seem to have been
accepted by the organized bar. These assumptions are based on
Supreme Court supremacy and exclusivity in terms of the capacity
to interpret the Constitution. The assumption is that what the
Supreme Court says, including its rationales, is elevated to the
same rank and stature as the language of the Constitution. Those
assumptions have to be very critically examined because they, in
my opinion, are wrong. If the entire debate surrounding this issue
promotes a very searching inquiry into those assumptions, it will
have served a good purpose. I hope that it will go further than
that, but I think it is very important to examine those assumptions
critically.

44. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (fifth amendment's pro-

hibition against double jeopardy does not, through the fourteenth amendment,
apply to the states).
45. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (the fourteenth amendment
does not incorporate the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights).
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MR. KAY: I don't think any of us have a problem with a reexamination of those assumptions. In fact, many of us can agree
with several of the points that Professor Rice has raised today. For
example, I think we can all agree that in many circumstances uniformity of interpretation is not essential or even advisable. Additionally, I think we can agree that judicial supremacy does not
mean judicial exclusivity. It is clear that all three branches have
an essential role to perform in enforcing the Constitution.
However, while these are interesting and important points, they
have little to do with the court jurisdiction proposals. The issue
before us is not whether an issue should be handled in a uniform
or a non-uniform manner. The issue before us is if the Supreme
Court holds that the Constitution requires a uniform interpretation
of an issue, does Congress have the power to undo that uniformity
by simple statute? The issue is not whether Supreme Court decisions are the final word on any subject-clearly they are not.
Rather, the issue is whether constitutional decisions of the Supreme
Court should continue to be given the deference they have been
given for the last 200 years.
The court jurisdiction removal proposals are based on the
premise that once the Supreme Court has spoken on a constitutional issue, Congress can overturn the Court's decision by simple
statute. I suggest we might look at a constitutional decision of the
Supreme Court in the same way we look at a presidential veto of
legislation. Congress cannot overturn the President's veto by a
fifty-one percent majority. It takes two-thirds of the Congress.
Similarly, the way we have operated up until now in this
country, is that when the Court speaks on a constitutional issue, a
simple Congressional majority cannot alter one of its decisions.
Supreme Court decisions, while not the exclusive comment on a
topic, should continue to be given the deference they have traditionally been given. We should not remove that deference and
permit constitutional decisions to be overturned by simple majorities of Congress.
DR. MCCLELLAN: Three quick points because I know you

want to go. First of all, the question was asked whether there was
such a thing as an unconstitutional Supreme Court decision. I am
again reminded of Justice Brandeis' remark in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins 46 where he stated in no uncertain terms that the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Swift v. Tyson 7 was uncon46. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

47. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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stitutional. Thus, at least one distinguished Justice or should I
say one Supreme Court, has realized that a Supreme Court decision
could be unconstitutional.
Second, it seems to me that the court jurisdiction issues in the
final analysis are not so much legal as they are political, or rather
theoretical in terms of their relationship to the fundamental framework of our government. That is to say, I think that there is an
important separation of powers issue involved here with regard to
the control of the Supreme Court. If Congress cannot regulate
the Court's jurisdiction or control the Court through the exceptions
clause, then the Court is basically uncontrollable. The only alternative is the amendment process, but as Sam Ervin said in 1968,
"You can't pass Constitutional amendments fast enough to control
the Court." 48 It is not a workable solution to rely on the amendment process to check the judiciary. That is not the purpose of the
amendment process.
Finally, I think the jurisdiction issue involves fundamental
questions of democratic theory. When the Court repeatedly exercises judicial review over state legislatures and over the United
States Congress, it is in an undemocratic posture. Perhaps in the
short run, we can live with the situation, but over the long haul,
we cannot tolerate a completely uncontrollable institution having
such dramatic input in a democratic society. It was in anticipation
of such usurpations that the Framers gave Congress the tools to
curb the power of the court. If the Court should go out of control,
the exceptions clause provides for the long term implementation of
democratic ideals.
JUDGE SLOVITER: I did not come here to defend the federal
judiciary. I do not see that as my role. It is only in the last two
years or so that I have become aware of how the federal judiciary
is both beleaguered and unpopular. Although I hasten to note as
I hope you did that so far we have only heard criticism of the
district courts and the Supreme Court (laughter). I asked Dr.
McClellan at lunch why there are some adverse feelings in Congress towards the federal judiciary and he suggests that probably
the perception of activism by the federal courts has aroused these
feelings. I imagine there is also a perception in Washington that
federal judges tend to misconstrue Congressional statutes. But

48. Hearings on the Supreme Court, Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 (June
11, 1968) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
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unless you sit in the position where you have to make the decisions, it is very hard to understand the judiciary's dilemma. In
the first place, when you are dealing with a federal statute, it would
be very simple if the federal statute was clear. Unfortunately, and
I think we all have to agree, the statutes are not always clear. In
many instances, the court simply does not have before it a provision that is needed in order to make a decision. Either by inadvertence, or bad legislative draftsmanship, or because Congress
wanted to pass the buck, or because it was politically unpalatable
to make the decision, Congress failed to include a crucial provision
in the statute. So, you are left with the federal judiciary making
what is essentially a legislative judgment because nobody else has
done it.
When the federal judiciary is dealing with constitutional questions, it is obviously our constitutional function to arrive at a
decision. However, neither I nor my colleagues go out of our way
to make a hard constitutional decision unless it is essential. I often
walk to work and when I do, I walk through Independence Hall
Courtyard. The first year that I was on the bench I had a very
difficult, never before decided, esoteric constitutional issue. When
I walked through the courtyard, I kept looking up at Independence
Hall, trying to exorcise those ghosts so that they could tell me what
they had in mind when they put a specific provision in the sixth
amendment. Well, I did not get any assistance from them and
unfortunately, the minutes of those parts of the constitutional debates are not available because someone got sick. Therefore, there
is a big gap in the pertinent history. In circumstances like that
you do the best that you can, and if it is activism, it is inevitable.
The final comment I wanted to leave you with is the hope
that there will be no error in attribution and that nobody will
leave here thinking that I ever said that the Supreme Court can
make an unconstitutional decisionl (laughter).

